Abstract：This paper proposes a new equilibrium concept “robust perfect equilibrium” for non-cooperative games with a continuum of players, incorporating three types of perturbations. Such an equilibrium is shown to exist (in symmetric mixed strategies and also in pure strategies) and satisfy the important properties of admissibility, aggregate robustness, and ex post robust perfection. These properties strengthen relevant equilibrium results in an extensive literature on strategic interactions among a large number of agents. Illustrative applications to congestion games are presented. In the particular case of a congestion game with strictly increasing cost functions, we show that there is a unique symmetric robust perfect equilibrium.

Keywords：Robust perfect equilibrium；Admissibility；Aggregate robustness；Expost robust perfection；Large games；Congestion games

研究成果：Robust perfect equilibrium in large games

发表期刊：Journal of Economic Theory

论文链接：

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053122000230