Abstract:This paper proposes a solution concept called the type-symmetric randomized equilibrium (TSRE), where agents with the same type of characteristics take the same randomized choice. It is shown that this solution concept provides a micro-foundation for the macro notion of equilibrium distribution for economies and games with many agents. In particular, any Walrasian (resp. Nash) equilibrium distribution in a large economy (resp. game) is shown to be uniquely determined by one TSRE if the agent space is modeled by the classical Lebesgue unit interval. The relationship of TSRE with other equilibrium notions is also established.

Keywords:Equilibrium distribution;Large economy;Large game;Lebesgue unit interval;Type-symmetric randomized equilibrium;Rich Fubini extension

研究成果：The individualistic foundation of equilibrium distribution

发表期刊：Journal of Economic Theory

论文链接：https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053120300788